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Abstract
We consider an economic geography model with two inter-regional proximity structures,
one due to trade linkages and the other due to social interactions. We investigate how the
network structure of social interactions, or the social proximity structure, affects the timing of
endogenous agglomeration and the spatial distribution ofworkers across regions. Endogenous
agglomeration emerges when inter-regional trade and/or social interactions incur high trans-
portation costs, and the uniform dispersion occurs when these costs become negligibly small
(i.e., when distance dies). In many-region geography, the network structure of social proximity
emerges as the determinant of the geographical distribution of workers when trade becomes
freer. If social proximity is governed by geographical distance (as in ground transportation),
a mono-centric concentration emerges. If geographically distant pairs of regions are “socially
close” (due to, e.g., passenger transportation modes with strong distance economy such as
regional airlines), then geographically multi-centric spatial distribution can be sustainable.
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1 Introduction
The spectacular drop in transportation costs ever since the Industrial Revolution has led to the
concentration of economic activities and population to fewer and fewer geographical locations.
Spatial economic theory has emphasized the roles of endogenous forces, hitherto outweighed by
first-order exogenous heterogeneities of locations, in shaping the lasting and sizable economic
agglomerations. Such localization of production in a small number of selected locations is cur-
rently in the process of evening out, partly due to the far-reaching developments in information
and communication technologies that have made it possible to organize complex production pro-
cesses even when they were separated by geographical distance (Baldwin, 2016). Hand-in-hand
with the shift of values towards service-oriented and high-tech sectors, the economic geography
inmatured economies in the current era is shapedmore andmore by interactions between people.
This paper addresses how interactions between people affect the unbundling process of a
geographically mono-centric economic agglomeration when inter-regional trade costs and/or
communication costs become negligibly small (i.e., when distance dies). To obtain first-order
theoretical implications, we develop a bare-bones economic geography model with one differen-
tiated sector and a finite number of locations. Trade of goods is costly. There is inter-regional
productivity spillover through social interactions. With the model, we draw qualitative insights
into the role of interactions between people on the timing and the form of workers’ agglomeration
and dispersion across regions.
We build on the general equilibrium framework proposed by Allen and Arkolakis (2014); we
assume a perfectly competitive Armington model with positive externalities and iceberg trans-
portation costs. The key difference is that we assume that the productivity of a region depends
on the whole spatial distribution of workers, in contrast to local spillover within each region. As
Rosenthal and Strange (2019) shows, agglomeration effects act in various spatial scales — e.g., the
regional, metropolitan, and neighborhood scales, or even within each building. To represent such
effects in a flexible fashion, we assume that a region’s productivity depends on an social proximity
matrix G = [ψij] that represents the structure of inter-regional communication between people.
Each ψij ∈ (0, 1] represents the level of positive externality aworker in region j has on one in region
i, so that region i’s productivity is given by ai = ∑j ψijxj where xj denotes the mass of workers
in region j. This setup includes, as a special case, spatially decaying technological externalities in
urbanmodels if, e.g., ψij = exp
(−τ`ij)with τ > 0 and geographical distance `ij between locations
i and j (e.g., Fujita andOgawa, 1982; Ahlfeldt et al., 2015). By considering the general specification,
we can disentangle the role played by the underlying geographical proximity structure and that
played by social interactions between people.
We first consider a symmetric two-region economy to elucidate the basic workings of the
social interactions. There are two key transportation cost parameters: the freeness of trade and
that of social interactions. Endogenous agglomeration emerges when the freeness of trade be-
tween regions and/or the freeness of social interactions between regions are low. The symmetric
dispersion of workers occurs when trade and social interactions become free, i.e., when distance
dies. When transportation is prohibitly costly, there is a full agglomeration of workers in one of
the regions. As transportation costs decline, this asymmetry is gradually resolved; the spatial
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configuration become increasingly symmetric, leading to the symmetric dispersion at threshold
values of transportation costs. This behavior is akin to the dispersion process in economic geogra-
phy models with urban costs (e.g., Helpman, 1998; Tabuchi, 1998) in that dispersion occur when
trade is freer, although our model do not have urban costs. The role of the additional dimension
— social interactions — is also intuitive. When social interactions are less costly, dispersion is
selected because there is fewer incentive to form agglomeration (i.e., the “death of distance”).
We then explore a symmetric four-region economy and consider various structure for social
proximity. It is the minimal setting to investigate the roles of the network structure of G, since
non-trivial (but symmetric) network structures can emerge only when the number of regions is
greater than three. Similar to the two-region setup, one of the regions attracts almost all workers
when trade and social interaction costs are very high. The economy exhibits a gradual dispersion
when these costs go down. The agglomeration force tends to support geographically mono-
centric pattern of workers along the dispersion process. If the social proximity structure is more
integrated as a whole, then agglomeration is less likely compared with less integrated networks.
This is because endogenous advantage due to social proximity plays less prominent role when
the economy is socially more integrated. Also, if some pair of regions are “socially closer,” then
various geographical configurations other than the mono-centric pattern can be sustainable. For
instance, geographically duo-centric concentration of workers emerges if geographically distant
pairs of regions are socially close because of, e.g., passenger transportation modes with strong
distance economy (such as regional airlines). In sum, the network structure of social interactions
can govern when the dispersion is attained and how it looks like in the process of unbundling of
a mono-centric economic agglomeration.
Out for simplicity and clarity, we build on a compromise that social proximity matrix G is
exogenously given. There are various possible micro-foundations for G. For instance, it may
represent the roles played by passenger travels that supports face-to-face contacts. It may be
some aggregate measure, embedded in regional space, of the inter-individual social network that
support information exchange and diffusion between regions. It can also be a reduced-form for
the decision of big players such as large companies which open up branches in provincial cities, or
airline companies connecting major regional cities. All of the interpretations above are meant to
be described by sophisticatedmodels, so that the structure ofGmay be endogenously determined
by micro-economic mechanisms. We instead give G exogenously, for our aim in this paper is
to provide the first-order insights into the workings of an additional inter-regional linkage other
than goods trade. This strategy is akin to that in the network game literature (Jackson, 2010)
that focuses on the roles of the structure of the inter-individual social network, or to that in the
economic geography literature in general where it is a standard approach to suppose an exogenous
inter-regional proximity structure.
In the following, Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 formulates the model. Section
4 studies the model in the simplest possible setup, the symmetric two-region economy. Section 5
illustrates the fundamental roles of the structure of the interaction network G. In this section, we
follow the strategy taken by Matsuyama (2017), in that we illustrate the effects of variation in the
inter-regional proximity structureG employing stylized examples. Section 6 concludes the paper.
3
2 Related literature
The current unbundling process of economic agglomeration may also be explained by the “bell-
shaped development” narrative for industrial agglomeration (Fujita and Thisse, 2013, Section 8).
The seminal theory of endogenous regional agglomeration after Krugman (1991) predicts that
the spatial distribution of economic activities in a country is organized into a mono-centric state
as transportation costs decline below a certain threshold in a many-region economy (Tabuchi
and Thisse, 2011; Ikeda et al., 2012; Akamatsu et al., 2012, 2019). This prediction is qualitatively
consistentwith data (Tabuchi, 2014). A further decline of inter-regional transportation cost induces
the flattening of mono-centric agglomeration (Helpman, 1998; Tabuchi, 1998), due to the rise of
the relative importance of urban costs, e.g., higher land rent and commuting costs. There is ample
evidence for the decline of peak population or production level of citieswhen transportation access
improves (e.g., Baum-Snow, 2007; Baum-Snow et al., 2017). We may thus interpret that developed
economies now face this final stage where once established economic clusters dissolve. These
theories, however, do not address how interactions between people matter for regional economy
because they deliberately focused on trade linkages as the mode of inter-location interaction in
favor of tractability (Fujita and Mori, 2005). Given the importance of people’s communication
in more and more information-intensive economies, we need a tractable theory that integrates
social interactions into general equilibrium economic geography models. This paper is one of
such attempts.
The interesting literature of inter-individual social interactions and cities (e.g., Helsley and
Zenou, 2014; Picard and Zenou, 2018) is thus related to our study. Also, the important literature
on economics of agglomeration (e.g., Beckmann, 1976; Fujita and Ogawa, 1982; Lucas and Rossi-
Hansberg, 2002; Helsley and Strange, 2014) examines how inter-location externalities influence
the urban spatial structure including the location of firms and households (see Fujita and Thisse,
2013, for a survey). We take an intermediate strategy between the former emerging literature,
which focuses on individual-level social interactions, and the latter literature, which focuses on
geographical proximity as the determinant of agglomeration economy. All the above models are
different from ours since we consider regional scale.
A question then arises about how inter-regional spillover can arise. Even though various
micro-foundations can be considered (as briefly discussed in the introduction), we highlight the
role of knowledge creation due to interaction between different cultures. According to Fujita (2007),
geography is an essential feature of knowledge creation and diffusion. For instance, people
residing in the same region interact more frequently and thus contribute to develop the same,
regional set of cultural ideas. Since geographically distant regions tend to develop different
cultures, the economy as a whole evolves according to the synergy which results from interactions
across different regions (i.e., different cultures). That is, as emphasized by Duranton and Puga
(2001), knowledge creation and location are inter-dependent. Berliant and Fujita (2012) developed
a model of spatial knowledge interactions and showed that higher cultural diversity and costly
communicationpromote the productivity of knowledge creation, which corroborates the empirical
findings of Ottaviano and Peri (2006, 2008) as well as the theoretical model of Ottaviano and
Prarolo (2009). If interaction betweendifferent regionswithdifferent cultures promotes knowledge
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creation, a region with good access in passenger transport will be more innovative and productive.
Our flexible model integrates such effects into a general equilibrium framework with costly trade.
Technically, we build on a general analytical method for an economic geography model devel-
oped in Ikeda et al. (2012) andAkamatsu et al. (2012), which is recently synthesized inAkamatsu et
al. (2019). Also, our four-region analysis is inspired by Matsuyama (2017), who considers various
tractable geographical settings to investigate how the underlying geographical structure affects
the home-market effect in multi-region economy. Barbero and Zofío (2016) is also related to ours,
for they focus on the role played by the topology of the underlying transportation network.
3 The Model
Consider an economy comprised of n regions, and let N ≡ {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of regions.
The economy is inhabited by a unit mass continuum of workers who are freely mobile across
regions. Each worker chooses one of the regions to locate in. The spatial distribution of workers
is denoted by x = (xi)i∈N , where xi ≥ 0 is the mass of workers in region i ∈ N . The set of all
possible x is therefore (n− 1)-dimensional simplex X ≡ {x ≥ 0 | ∑i∈N xi = 1}.
We take the Armington (1969) assumption. Each region produces a distinct variety of the
horizontally differentiated good. Workers derive utility from the consumption of differentiated
varieties. The workers are homogeneous and have identical constant-elasticity-of-substitution
(CES) preferences over differentiated varieties. Because the utility function is homothetic, the total
welfare in region j ∈ N is
Uj =
(
∑
i∈N
q
σ−1
σ
ij
) σ
σ−1
, (3.1)
where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties and qij is the amount of good
produced in region i and consumed in region j.
Production is perfectly competitive and labor is the only input factor. Each worker provides
a unit of labor inelastically in the region where they live and is compensated with a wage. The
nominalmarketwage in region j ∈ N is denoted bywj ≥ 0, and its spatial pattern byw = (wi)i∈N .
The wage is determined in market equilibrium which we describe later.
The only (external) centripetal force in the model comes from social interactions. We assume
that the productivity in region i is given as:
ai(x) = ∑
j∈N
ψijxj, (3.2)
where ψij is the level of externalities from j to i. We denoteG ≡ [ψij] and callG the social proximity
matrix. Some assumptions on G are introduced.
Assumption 1. The social proximity matrix G = [ψij] satisfies the following property:
(a) ψij ∈ (0, 1] for all i, j ∈ N with ψii = 1, and
(b) z>Gz = ∑ij ψijzizj > 0 for any z = (zi)i∈N such that ∑i∈N zi = 0.
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Assumption 1 (a), in particular the positivity of every ψij, simplifies the proof of existence of
spatial equilibrium. It is not restrictive, since ψij can be arbitrarily close to zero. Assumption 1 (b)
is an assumption for interpretation and is less relevant in the theoretical analysis of the model. If
the matrix G satisfies Assumption 1 (b), then a(x) = (ai(x))i∈N = Gx exhibits positive effects of
agglomeration (see, e.g., Osawa and Akamatsu, 2019). For example, consider z = e(ei − ej), with
e > 0 and ei being ith standard basis. That is, z represents infinitesimal relocation of workers
from j to i. Under Assumption 1 (b), the gain in ai induced by such a relocation vector z is strictly
greater than the gain in aj, that is, we have ai(x+ z)− ai(x) > aj(x+ z)− aj(x). That is, relocation
of workers induce self-reinforcing effects in terms of regional productivity.
Inter-regional transportation of differentiated goods is costly. We assume iceberg transporta-
tion costs, i.e., τij ≥ 1 units should be shipped from i for a unit to arrive at j, with τii = 1. Under
perfect competition, the price of the good produced in i and consumed in j is given by
pij =
wi
ai
τij. (3.3)
A higher freeness of social interactions increases productivity and firms with higher worker
productivity face lower marginal costs and thus charge a smaller optimal price pij. Under the CES
assumption, the value shipped from location i to j is given by
Qij =
p1−σij
P1−σj
wjxj, (3.4)
where Pj is the CES price index:
Pj =
(
∑
i∈N
p1−σij
) 1
1−σ
=
(
∑
i∈N
aσ−1i w
1−σ
i φij
) 1
1−σ
, (3.5)
with φij ≡ τ1−σij ∈ (0, 1]. Below, we denote D = [φij] and call D the geographical proximity matrix.
A key assumption here is that all entries of D are strictly positive, i.e., 1 ≤ τij < ∞, which would
be natural:
Assumption 2. φij ∈ (0, 1] for all i, j ∈ N with φii = 1.
We take Assumptions 1 and 2 to hold throughout the paper.
The regional price index is decreasing in ai, implying that a higher freeness of social interactions
decreases the cost of living in region i. As a result, global demand is increasing in the freeness of
communications. Markets clear if the regional income is equal to the value of goods sold in all
regions, that is, for all i ∈ N :
wixi = ∑
k∈N
Qik = ∑
k∈N
aσ−1i w
1−σ
i φik
∑l∈N aσ−1l w
1−σ
l φlk
wkxk. (3.6)
To normalize w, we assume that the total income of the economy is unity:
∑
i∈N
wixi = 1. (3.7)
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Suppose x is positive, that is, xi > 0 for all i ∈ N . Then, there is unique wage vectorw that solves
market equilibrium conditions (3.6) and (3.7), which leads to the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. There exists unique positive solution w to (3.6) and (3.7) at any positive spatial distribution x.
For any i ∈ N , wi → ∞ as xi → 0.
See Appendix A for the proof. Below, all the proofs for the lemmas or propositions, and the
associated technical derivations, are found in Appendix A.
In other words, (3.6) and (3.7) defines w as an implicit function of x. Also, the wage of worker
in a region diverges as the mass of workers goes to zero.
With market wage w(x), per capita indirect utility in region i is given by
vi(x) =
wi(x)
Pi(x)
, (3.8)
where we emphasize that price index Pi is also a function of x through a(x) and w(x). We use
v(x) = (vi(x))i∈N to denote the indirect utility, or the payoff, of workers as the function of the
spatial distribution x. Wage w is differentiable in x due to the implicit function theorem; thus, v
is differentiable whenever xi > 0 for all i ∈ N .
The exogenous parameters of the model are elasticity of substitution σ > 1, geographical
proximity matrix D, and social proximity matrix G. Given parameter values, a spatial equilibrium
of the model is a spatial distribution x of workers, and its associated market wage w which
satisfies (3.6), that equalizes utility of mobile workers across all regions. In other words, a spatial
distribution x is a spatial equilibrium if no mobile worker in region i has an incentive to move to
another region j 6= i. The next result establishes the existence of a spatial equilibrium.
Proposition 1. There exists a spatial equilibrium for any σ > 1. All spatial equilibria are positive; all
regions are populated at any spatial equilibrium.
The model can thus exhibit the so-called “partial agglomeration.” Because there is positive
demand for all varieties at any finite level of transportation cost under the Armington assumption
and labor is the only input, the market wage of an individual worker diverges when the mass of
workers in the same region goes to zero. Thus, the worker’s utility in such a region goes to infinity.
Therefore, no spatial equilibrium can incorporate depopulated regions. We will illustrate this in
Section 4 by numerical examples.
Since multiple equilibria may arise due to the centripetal force embedded by a(·), we consider
equilibrium refinement based on some myopic dynamics x˙ = f (x). We focus on dynamics of
the form x˙ = f (x) = f (x, v(x)), i.e., the dynamics that maps spatial distribution x and payoff
level v(x) to a motion vector. We assume that f and f˜ are differentiable for all positive x and
satisfy (i) f (x) = 0 if and only if x is a spatial equilibrium of our model and (ii) if f (x) 6= 0, then
v(x)> f (x) > 0, and (iii) P f (x, v(x)) = f (Px,Pv(x)) for all permutation matrices P. Conditions
(i) and (ii) are, respectively, calledNash stationality and positive correlation (Sandholm, 2010), which
are themost parsimonious assumptions we can impose on a dynamic f to be “consistent” with the
underlying model (payoff function) v. Condition (iii) ensures that f is not biased, i.e., it does not
ex-ante prefer some regions to the others. In other words, we suppose that all location incentives
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for workers are captured by the payoff function. We suppose f is C1, only because we employ
linear stability as the definition of stability. We call dynamics that satisfy conditions (i), (ii), and
(iii) admissible dynamics.
Admissible dynamics include, for instance, the Brown–von Neumann–Nash dynamic (Brown and
von Neumann, 1950; Nash, 1951), the Smith dynamic (Smith, 1984), the Euclidian projection dynamic
(Dupuis and Nagurney, 1993), and the replicator dynamic (Taylor and Jonker, 1978). See Sandholm
(2010) for more examples. The replicator dynamic, which is a standard choice in the economic
geography literature, is defined as
x˙i = fi(x, v(x)) ≡
(
vi(x)− ∑
k∈N
xkvk(x)
)
xi. (3.9)
The dynamic can violate condition (i) in general payoff functions v(x). However, it satisfies
condition (i) in the interior of X and is hence applicable to our model, since spatial equilibria are
always interior. The stability claims in the rest of the paper hold true for any admissible dynamics.
We show general properties at the extremal values of transportation costs. Obviously, the
uniform distribution of workers across regions is an equilibrium if trade and social interactions
are completely frictionless. We formalize as follows.
Proposition 2. Consider the “death-of-distance” limit where trade and social interactions between different
regions are completely costless, i.e., the limit when φij → 1 and ψij → 1 for all i, j ∈ N . Then, the uniform
distribution x¯ = (x¯, x¯, . . . , x¯) with x¯ ≡ 1n is the unique and stable spatial equilibrium.
On the other hand, in the converse limit where trade and social interactions are too costly, the only
stable equilibria are full agglomeration towards one of the regions.
Proposition 3. Consider the “autarky” limit where trade and social interactions between different regions
are prohibitively costly, i.e., the limit when φij → 0 and ψij → 0 for all i 6= j. Stable equilibrium spatial
patterns are full agglomeration in one of the regions, that is, xi = 1 for some i ∈ N and xj = 0 for all j 6= i.
Propositions 2 and 3 show that the economy exhibits a dispersion process from a mono-centric con-
figuration when transportation costs decline. We will confirm this through examples in Sections
4 and 5. Proposition 3 demonstrates that there are possibility of multiple equilibria, as expected.
Below, we explore concrete exampleswhich are designed to illustrate the essential implications
of considering the social proximity structure. Section 4 considers the canonical starting point, the
symmetric two regions. Section 5 considers four-region setups with various social proximity
structure G to investigate the role of the network structure.
4 Dispersion process in a two-region economy
As usual, we start with the simplest possible setup — the symmetric two regions — to elucidate
basic workings of themodel. We study the stability of the symmetric equilibrium, i.e., the uniform
distribution. In particular, we show that the uniform distribution is stable when transportation
of goods are freer, which is akin to the model by Helpman (1998). In our model, there is another
proximity measure: the freeness of social interactions between the two regions.
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When the regions are symmetric, it is natural to assume that
D =
[
1 φ
φ 1
]
and G =
[
1 ψ
ψ 1
]
, (4.1)
where φ ∈ (0, 1) and ψ ∈ (0, 1). We call φ the freeness of trade and ψ the freeness of communication.
It is easy to see that the uniform distribution x¯ ≡ (x¯, x¯) with x¯ = 12 is a spatial equilibrium for all
(σ, φ,ψ). We have w1 = w2 = 1 and v1(x¯) = v2(x¯) = v¯ ≡ (1+ ψ)(1+ φ) 1σ−1 x¯ > 0 at x¯.
The symmetric distribution x¯ is stable (unstable) if the utility gain for an agent relocating
from one region to the other is negative (positive). In the two-region economy, the gain for a
hypothetical migrant can be evaluated by the following elasticity:
ω =
x¯
v¯
∂(v1 − v2)
∂x1
(x¯) =
x¯
v¯
(
∂v1
∂x1
(x¯)− ∂v2
∂x1
(x¯)
)
. (4.2)
The gain ω is a positive scalar multiple
( x¯
v¯
)
of an eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix of v(x) at x¯.
Multiplying x¯v¯ > 0 simplifies the formulae in what follows.
Ifω < 0, then x¯ is stable because there is no incentive for agents tomigrate; ifω < 0, a marginal
increase in themass ofworkers in a region induces a relative decrease of the per capita utility therein.
Similarly, x¯ is unstable if ω > 0; when a small fraction of workers relocate from region 2 to 1, then
it induces a relative increase of the payoff in region 1, encouraging further migration from region 2.
Thus, if we start from a state where x¯ is stable (ω < 0), endogenous agglomeration emerges when
the gain turns to positive (ω > 0).
We can evaluate ω as follows:
ω = Ω(χ,λ) ≡ −1+ χ+ ((σ− 1) + σχ) λ
σ+ (σ− 1)χ , (4.3)
where χ ∈ (0, 1) and λ ∈ (0, 1) are respectively defined by
χ ≡ 1− φ
1+ φ
and λ ≡ 1− ψ
1+ ψ
. (4.4)
The variables χ and λ are, respectively, the eigenvalues of row-normalized proximity matrices
1
1+φD and
1
1+ψG, with the associated eigenvector being z = (1,−1).
As it turns out, Ω plays a major role in our analysis of the model.1 The variables χ and λ
can be understood as, respectively, indices of trade costs and interaction costs. For instance, χ
is decreasing in φ, that is, χ is large (small) when trade barriers are high (low). Note that the
denominator of ω is positive for all admissible values of σ and φ.
The numerator of ω reveals the net agglomeration and dispersion forces in the model. The
first term is negative and thus represents the dispersion force due to costly trade. In particular,
if a is a constant vector that does not depend on the spatial distribution of workers, then λ = 0
and thus ω < 0. That is, x¯ is always stable if a is constant. This is simply because, without any
agglomerative forces, costly trade of goods discourages uneven concentration of workers. Also,
1In the context of economic geography models with no social proximity structure, Akamatsu et al. (2019) calls Ω
that satisfies ω ≡ Ω(χ) the gain function of a model.
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we see that the dispersion force strengthens when φ increases, since χ is decreasing in φ. Because
every region specializes on a single variety, workers’ love for variety due to the CES preferences
induces a stronger centrifugal forcewhen trade is freer. The second term is positive and represents
the agglomerative force due to the productivity spillover (3.2). Because λ ∈ (0, 1) is monotonically
decreasing in ψ, this force is at its strongest when ψ is small, which is intuitive.
To obtain more insights, we may break down ω as follows:
ω = eaαx + ewβx, (4.5)
where ea and ew are the following elasticities of payoff difference v1 − v2 with respect to, respec-
tively, a1 and w1 at x = x¯:
ea ≡ a¯v¯
(
∂v1
∂a1
(x¯)− ∂v2
∂a1
(x¯)
)
and ew ≡ w¯v¯
(
∂v1
∂w1
(x¯)− ∂v2
∂w1
(x¯)
)
, (4.6)
with a¯ ≡ a1(x¯) = a¯(1+ ψ) and w¯ = 1 being the uniform levels of regional productivity and wage.
Also, αx and βx are, respectively, the following elasticities of a1 and w1 with respect to migration
of workers from one region to the other:
αx ≡ x¯a¯
(
∂a1
∂x1
(x¯)− ∂a1
∂x2
(x¯)
)
and βx ≡ x¯w¯
(
∂w1
∂x1
(x¯)− ∂w1
∂x2
(x¯)
)
. (4.7)
Note that regions are interchangeable, so we can swap the indices in the above expressions.
At the uniform distribution x¯, we can evaluate as follows:
ea = χ, ew = 1− χ, αx = λ, and βx = (σ− 1)(1+ χ)λ− 1
σ+ (σ− 1)χ . (4.8)
All the first three elasticities are positive and thus migration of workers tends to cause positive
circular causality and thus destabilize x¯. When trade is more costly (φ is small and thus χ is large),
then the payoff difference is more sensitive to the variation in productivity (ea is large), whereas it
is less sensitive to wage (ew is small). Also, a region’s productivity is sensitive to migration when
social interactions are costly because αx = λ is large when ψ is small.
Only the last elasticity, βx, can be negative and produce a stabilizing effect. It is negative when
(σ− 1)(1 + χ)λ < 1, that is, when ψ and φ are sufficiently large (and/or σ is sufficiently small).
In fact, βx can be further decomposed as follows:
βx = ξaαx + ξx = λξa + ξx, (4.9)
where ξa and ξx are the elasticities of nominal wage difference w1−w2 respect to, respectively, the
productivity in region 1 and the mass of worker in region 1 and are given as follows:
ξa ≡ a¯w¯
(
∂w1
∂a1
(x¯)− ∂w2
∂a1
(x¯)
)
=
(σ− 1)(1+ χ)
σ+ (σ− 1)χ > 0 (4.10)
ξx ≡ x¯w¯
(
∂w1
∂x1
(x¯)− ∂w2
∂x1
(x¯)
)
= − 1
σ+ (σ− 1)χ < 0. (4.11)
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Figure 1: Stability of x¯ in the two-region economy (σ = 4.0).
Notes: The uniform distribution x¯ is stable for the shaded (gray) region of (φ,ψ) and the black solid curve
indicates the critical pair of (φ,ψ) where x¯ becomes unstable. The horizontal and vertical dashed lines
correspond to the parametric paths for the bifurcation diagrams Figure 2a and Figure 2b, respectively.
The schematic on each (gray or white) parametric region indicates the representative spatial pattern in the
parametric region.
We see that ξa > 0. A population increase in region 1 induces relative productivity increase
αx = λ > 0, which in turn gives rise to an increase in nominal wage in the region since ξaαx > 0.
On the other hand, ξw < 0. If the mass of worker in a region increases, then it brings about a
negative effect on nominal wage since the total revenue in a region is given by wixi. The single
value ω thus captures the net effect through the combination of all the effects discussed above.
With the formula of ω, we have the following characterization of the stability of x¯.
Proposition 4. Suppose n = 2. Assume D and G in (4.1). Then, the uniform distribution x¯ = (x¯, x¯) is
linearly stable if and only if ω = Ω(χ,λ) < 0.
Figure 1 shows Proposition 4 on the (φ,ψ)-space. For illustration, we let σ = 4.0; the results
remain invariant under a reasonable range of values for sigma.2 The stability condition ω < 0 is
satisfied when both φ and ψ are relatively high. The black solid curve shows the critical pairs of
(φ,ψ) below which x¯ becomes unstable, i.e., the solutions for ω(φ,ψ) = Ω(χ(φ),λ(ψ)) = 0. The
uniform distribution x¯ is stable in the shaded areas of (φ,ψ), and unstable otherwise. For any
φ ∈ (0, 1), x¯ is stable when the freeness of social interactions ψ is sufficiently high. When ψ is small
and inter-region communication is lower, agents tend to agglomerate due to positive externalities.
Let φ∗ be the critical value of φ at which x¯ becomes unstable. In terms of σ and ψ, the critical
value is given as follows:
φ∗ = (2σ− 1) λ
2+ λ
= (2σ− 1)1− ψ
3+ ψ
> 0. (4.12)
If φ∗ ∈ (0, 1), then the uniform distribution is stable for all φ ∈ (φ∗, 1). If otherwise φ∗ ≥ 1, then
x¯ is unstable for all φ ∈ (0, 1), so that the economy always exhibits asymmetry (e.g., x1 > x2). For
this reason, the requirement that φ∗ ∈ (0, 1) may be called “no-black-hole” condition following
Fujita et al. (1999). We have φ∗ ∈ (0, 1) either when σ ∈ (1, 2) (which is unrealistic) or when
σ ≥ 2 and ψ > σ−2σ . If instead ψ ≤ σ−2σ , then x¯ is unstable for any φ. It is natural that when the
2See Appendix B.
11
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
(a) (ψ, σ) = (0.8, 4.0)
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Figure 2: Bifurcation diagrams for the symmetric two-region economy.
Notes: In Figures 2a and 2b, the black solid curves indicate stable spatial equilibria, whereas dashed curves
unstable ones. The schematics by the black solid curve show the spatial configurations, where the size of
each gray disk indicates the size of a region. In Figure 2c, the transparent gray surface indicates the stable
equilibria in terms of x1. Figures 2a and 2b are the cross sections of the surface at, respectively, ψ = 0.8 and
φ = 0.5. We can consider various cross sections of the surface, or curves over the (φ,ψ)-space, to investigate
the effects of simultaneous changes in (φ,ψ).
elasticity of substitution σ is relatively large and the freeness of interaction ψ is relatively small,
then migration towards one of the regions is profitable.
When the thresholdvalueφ∗ (or that in termsofψ) is attained, theuniformdistributionbecomes
unstable and endogenous agglomeration emerges. Figure 2 shows the bifurcation diagram of
stable spatial equilibria in termsof x1 whenφ and/orψ varies. Figures 2a and2b show, respectively,
the bifurcation diagrams for the horizontal and vertical dashed lines in Figure 1. Figure 2c shows
the bifurcation diagram of stable equilibrium values of x1 over the full (φ,ψ)-space. The uniform
distribution is stable for high values of φ orψ, and the stable paths are continuous in transportation
cost parameter axes. Thus, the model highlights the process of the resolution of an established
agglomerationwhen φ and/or ψmonotonically increases. This is akin toHelpman (1998)’s model,
with an additional dimension of social proximityψ. There are no catastrophic jumps nor hysteresis
when x¯ becomes unstable, which is also similar to Helpman (1998) and others. We can formally
show that the bifurcation from x¯ is a supercritical pitchfork, which essentially means that the
dispersion process is “reversible.”
Proposition 5. The bifurcation from x¯ in the course of decreasing φ, or decreasing ψ, is of the supercritical
pitchfork form. The dispersion process of economic activities is smooth and gradual as the economy become
more symmetric.
Asymmetries in the proximity matrices (D andG) induce straightforward comparative advan-
tages. Figure 3 shows examples in which the two regions are asymmetric. In Figures 3a and 3b,
we respectively assume D and G of the form
D =
[
1 φ1.1
φ 1
]
and G =
[
1 ψ
ψ1.1 1
]
. (4.13)
For both the cases, region 1 has comparative advantage (in terms of cost of living or productivity).
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(a) (ψ, σ) = (0.8, 4.0), φ12 = φ1.1 < φ
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(b) (φ, σ) = (0.5, 4.0), ψ21 = ψ1.1 < ψ
Figure 3: Bifurcation diagrams for the asymmetric two-region economy.
Notes: Black solid curves indicate stable spatial equilibria, whereas dashed curves unstable ones. The
diamond (♦) in each figure indicates the limit point from which a pair of unstable and stable equilibria
emerge. φ∗ and ψ∗ indicate the critical values for the symmetric setups shown in Figure 2.
The bifurcation diagrams exhibit the standard unfolding behavior for the supercritical pitchfork
bifurcation, for which transition on the main path (the path with x1 > x2) is smooth without any
catastrophic behaviors. The economy is always asymmetric and the uniform distribution emerges
only in the limits φ→ 1 or ψ→ 1.
5 How the network structure of social proximity matters
We now turn our attention to a multi-region geography with more than two regions to identify
two quintessential roles of the social proximity structure G: (i) one on the timing of dispersion;
and (ii) the other on the overall spatial distribution of workers.
This section considers a symmetric four-region geography in which n = 4 regions are equidis-
tantly placed over a circular transportation network (see Figure 4), as in Matsuyama (2017),
Example 2. This is a simplified version of the 12-location race-track economy of Krugman (1993).
It is the minimal symmetric geographical environment in which different regions have different
neighbors (three is not enough). By postulating that the transportation of goods is only possible
over the circular network, we can assume that the geographical proximity matrix is given by
D =

1 φ φ2 φ
1 φ φ2
1 φ
Sym. 1
 , (5.1)
where φ ∈ (0, 1) is the freeness of trade between two consecutive regions over the economy.
Four is also the minimal number that allow nontrivial structures of social interactions between
locations. TakingD in (5.1) as given, we consider three stylized settings forG, shown in Figure 5, to
elucidate the basic roles of the social proximity structure. Figure 5a shows the baseline case where
the movement of people is governed by a similar transportation technology as goods trade (e.g.,
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Region 1 Region 2
Region 3Region 4
ϕ
Figure 4: Four-region symmetric geography.
Notes: The black circle represents the transportation network, whereas the black markers represent the
regions. All regions have the same level of geographical proximity to the other regions.
ψ
(a) G
ψ
ψ′
(b) G (ψ′ ≥ ψ2)
ψ′
ψ
(c) G (ψ′ ≤ ψ)
Figure 5: Various social proximity structures in the symmetric four-region geography.
Notes: (a) The baseline case where the movement of people is governed by a similar transportation tech-
nology as goods trade (e.g., highways, low-speed railways). (b) A case where the pairs of regions at the
antipodal locations are socially close (due to some transportationmodes specialized to passenger trips, e.g.,
high-speed railways, regional airlines). (c) A case where the social proximity matrix have a hierarchical
structure (due to, e.g., intra-country developments of passenger transports before an economic integration).
highways, low-speed railways). Figure 5b represents a case where there are some transportation
modes specialized to passenger trips such as regional airlines, which tend to shorten travel time
across distant locations. Figure 5c is a case where the passenger transportation modes has a block
structure due to, e.g., intra-country developments before a major economic integration.
The social proximity matrices for the three cases are, respectively, given as follows:
G =

1 ψ ψ2 ψ
1 ψ ψ2
1 ψ
Sym. 1
 , G =

1 ψ ψ′ ψ
1 ψ ψ′
1 ψ
Sym. 1
 , and G =

1 ψ ψ′ψ ψ′
1 ψ′ ψ′ψ
1 ψ
Sym. 1
 (5.2)
where ψ ∈ (0, 1) and ψ′ ∈ (0, 1). For G, we assume ψ′ > 2ψ− 1 to satisfy Assumption 1 (b).
In fact, G is a special case of G where ψ′ = ψ2. For G, we assume ψ′ ≤ ψ without loss of
generality.
All regions have the same level of geographical proximity to the other regions under D in
(5.1). Also, for any G, G, and G, the social proximity matrix does not induce any ex-ante
comparative advantage of regions and preserves the symmetry of the four-region economy. Thus,
uniform distribution x¯ = (x¯, x¯, x¯, x¯) with x¯ ≡ 14 is a spatial equilibrium for any (σ, φ,ψ,ψ′). In the
following, we study the stability of x¯ and endogenous agglomeration from x¯.
An important difference from the two-region case is that there are three qualitatively distinct
migration patterns when x¯ becomes unstable. Figure 6 schematically shows the three possible
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(a) Mono-centric pattern (b) Duo-centric pattern (c) North–South pattern
Figure 6: Schematics of the possible endogenous outcomes in the symmetric four-region economy.
Notes: The black circle indicates the transportation network. Each gray disk represents the population size
of each region. We do not show rotationally symmetric patterns that are essentially equivalent to the three
patterns shown above (e.g., the “East–West” pattern).
outcomes. These migration patterns are, in fact, the eigenvectors of the Jacobian matrix of the
payoff function at x¯. Figure 6a and Figure 6c correspond to the formation of a mono-centric spatial
distributionwhere one region or two contiguous regions attract themajority of workers. The latter
may be called the “North–South” pattern. Figure 6b corresponds to the emergence of duo-centric
configuration where two geographically remote regions are vying with each other.
A more “realistic” setup is the star-shaped network, where one of the regions — maybe the
host of the capital city — is the hub for the social interactions in the economy. For example, when
region 1 is connected symmetrically to all the other regions but there is no direct interaction path
between regions 2, 3, and 4, we have
GF =

1 ψ ψ ψ
1 ψ2 ψ2
1 ψ2
Sym. 1
 . (5.3)
This assumption induces an exogenous advantage in region 1, thereby the results are straightfor-
ward (cf. the asymmetric cases in Section 4). That is, the spatial pattern becomes mono-centric,
with region 1 as the central location. We instead focus on symmetric networks where no region
has exogenous advantages in terms of proximity to the other regions.
5.1 The baseline case and endogenous agglomeration in many-region settings
This section considers the most straightforward assumption, G (Figure 5a), where the social
proximity matrix has a similar structure to the geographical proximity matrix D. This setup is
related to geographically decaying spillovers considered in urban economics models.
Inmany-region settings to be considered in Section 5, the stability of x¯ = (x¯, x¯, x¯, x¯) is governed
by the largest eigenvalue of the payoff elasticity matrix V = x¯v¯∇v(x¯). To see this, suppose that x¯ is
perturbed to become x′ = x¯+ z with small z = (zi)i∈N , where z>1 = ∑i∈N zi = 0 because the
total population is constant. In other words, z is a migration pattern. The average gain (in terms
of relative payoff) induced by such a deviation is
ω¯(z) ≡ z>Vz (5.4)
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because we show, via linearization v(x′) ≈ v(x¯) +∇v(x¯)z, that the elasticity of average payoff
∑i∈N vi(x)xi is computed as
x¯
v¯
(
∑
i∈N
vi(x′)x′i − ∑
i∈N
vi(x¯)x¯
)
≈ z>Vz. (5.5)
If ω¯(z) < 0 for anyperturbation z, then any formofmigration is strictly non-profitable formigrants
and hence x¯ is stable.
Appendix A.2 shows that the average gain ω¯ is maximized by deviation of the form z = z∗,
where z∗ is the eigenvector of V associated with its largest eigenvalue, ω∗ ≡ maxk{ωk}. That is,
we have
max
z
ω¯ = ω¯(z∗) = ω∗, (5.6)
where {ωk} are the eigenvalues of V. If ω∗ < 0, then ω¯ < 0 for any z. When ω∗ switches from
negative to positive, then migration towards z∗-direction becomes profitable for workers and the
spatial pattern of the form x′ = x¯+ ez∗ (e > 0) emerges.
When G = G, we have
z∗ = (1, 0,−1, 0), (5.7)
which is an eigenvector of V. We have ω∗z∗ = Vz∗ = V>z∗ and thus
ω∗ =
x¯
v¯
(
∂v1
∂x1
(x¯)− ∂v3
∂x1
(x¯)
)
. (5.8)
Analogous to (4.2), (5.8) indicates that the migration from region 3 to 1 is profitable for workers.
Thus, when ω∗ turns from negative, the spatial pattern becomes a mono-centric pattern of the
form x′ = x¯+ ez∗ = (x¯+ e, x¯, x¯− e, x¯), as in Figure 6a.
The above discussion generalizes the two-region investigationwherewe employ gainω. When
n = 2, ω is the only relevant eigenvalue of V and z∗ = (1,−1). Endogenous agglomeration is
essentially x = x¯+ ez∗ = (x¯+ e, x¯− e).
The next proposition characterizes the stability of x¯ and endogenous agglomeration from it.
Proposition 6. Suppose n = 4. Assume D in (5.1) and G = G. Then, ω∗ = Ω(χ,λ) and z∗ =
(1, 0,−1, 0). The uniform distribution x¯ is linearly stable if and only if ω∗ < 0. When x¯ becomes unstable,
then a mono-centric pattern of the form x¯+ ez∗ (e > 0) emerges.
Figure 6a shows the endogenous spatial pattern under this setting. In Proposition 6, χ and λ are
the same as Proposition 4, that is, χ = 1−φ1+φ and λ =
1−ψ
1+ψ . These are, in fact, the eigenvalues of the
row-normalized proximity matrices
D¯ ≡ 1
1+ 2φ+ φ2
D and G¯ ≡ 1
1+ 2ψ+ ψ2
G, (5.9)
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Figure 7: Bifurcation diagram for the four-region circular economy with social proximity matrix G.
Notes: ψ = 0.7 and σ = 4. The solid curves indicate stable equilibria, whereas the dashed curves indicate
unstable ones. The red curve corresponds to a mono-centric pattern (stable), whereas the blue curve is
a duo-centric pattern (unstable). The schematics by the solid curves show representative snapshots of
associated stable spatial patterns.
since we have
D¯z∗ =
1− φ2
1+ 2φ+ φ2
z∗ =
1− φ
1+ φ
z∗ and G¯z∗ = 1− ψ
2
1+ 2ψ+ ψ2
z∗ =
1− ψ
1+ ψ
z∗, (5.10)
where χ and λ can be seen as, again, the measures of transportation and interaction costs in the
economy. As seen, ω∗ is computed via (χ,λ) and Ω, similar to the n = 2 case.
Figure 7 shows the bifurcation diagram for G = G in the φ-axis. The levels of φ at which
ω1 = 0 and ω2 = 0 are indicated by, respectively, φ∗1 and φ∗2 . We have ω∗ = max{ω1,ω2} = ω1
for any (φ,ψ, σ). As discussed in the two-region case, the dispersion force due to costly trade,
the first term in Ω(χ,λ), is triggered when φ is high. When φ is in its lower extreme (φ → 0),
workers can concentrate in a single region because the dispersion force is less important. The
spatial pattern is close to the complete agglomeration, e.g., x ≈ (1, 0, 0, 0), which is consistent
with Proposition 3. As φ increases, the relative rise of the dispersion force induces a crowding-out
from the populated region. The spatial pattern become, e.g., x = (x, x′, x′′, x′) with x > x′ > x′′,
which is a mono-centric pattern. As φ increases, the spatial pattern gradually flattens and, at
the threshold φ∗1 , the spatial pattern must connect to the uniform distribution. If we start from
x¯ and gradually decrease φ to see the dispersion process in the reverse-reproduced way, at φ∗1 the
spatial pattern must deviate in the direction of the “formation” of a mono-centric configuration
(Figure 6a). Proposition 6 predicts this bifurcation at φ∗1 . To the left of the figure, the two city
pattern also emerge (indicated by blue dashed curve). However, this configuration is always
unstable.
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5.2 How the network structure of social proximity affects the timing of dispersion?
We next illustrate that the timing of agglomeration varies with the structure ofG. If every region
has the same interaction level to different regions, we can assume thatG takes the following form:
G× ≡ G
∣∣∣
ψ′=ψ
=

1 ψ ψ ψ
1 ψ ψ
1 ψ
Sym. 1
 . (5.11)
This setup is akin to equidistant geographical networks considered by, e.g., Gaspar et al. (2018,
2019). This economy can be thought as an “almost connected economy,” since the payoff in a
region is invariant under the permutation of mobile workers in the other regions. That is, the
exact distribution of workers over the other regions does not matter.
For this setting, we have z∗ = (1, 0,−1, 0), in line with Section 5.1. The difference appears in
the measure of interaction cost. Concretely, we have the following result.
Proposition 7. Suppose n = 4. AssumeD in (5.1) andG = G× ≡ G∣∣
ψ′=ψ . Then, ω
∗ = Ω(χ, λ˜) and
z∗ = (1, 0,−1, 0), where λ˜ ≡ 1−ψ1+3ψ . The uniform distribution x¯ is linearly stable if and only if ω∗ < 0.
When x¯ become unstable, then a mono-centric pattern of the form x¯+ ez∗ (e > 0) emerges.
The only difference from Proposition 6 is that we have
λ˜ =
1− ψ
1+ 3ψ
(5.12)
at the place of λ. Similar to Section 5.1, λ˜ is the eigenvalue of G× associated with z∗. We see
λ˜ =
1− ψ
1+ 3ψ
<
1− ψ
1+ ψ
= λ, (5.13)
which indicates that the average level of interaction cost in the economy is higher for the network
G than for G|ψ′=ψ, which is intuitive.
As we note Ω(χ,λ) is increasing in λ, we have Ω(χ,λ) > Ω(χ, λ˜) for any (φ,ψ). As a result,
x¯ is stable for a wider range of (φ,ψ). Figure 8 illustrates this observation. The solid and dashed
curves indicate, respectively, critical pairs (φ∗,ψ∗) for the matricesG× andG. For each case, x¯ is
stable in the region above the threshold curve. The solid curve is always below the dashed curve,
so that x¯ is stable for a broader range of φ and ψ when G×. This is because, since the economy
is socially more “connected” than G = G, there is less incentive to form agglomeration. The
result suggests that if social interactions is “closer” than geographical distance, it can promote
dispersion of economic activities towards the peripheral regions.
5.3 How the network structure of social proximity affects the form of dispersion?
For both the cases considered in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, endogenous mechanisms induce a mono-
centric agglomeration of the form Figure 6a. Endogenous spatial patterns can be, in fact, affected
by interaction structure G.
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Figure 8: Stability of x¯ in the four-region economies with G and G× = G|ψ′=ψ (σ = 4).
Notes: The black solid curve shows the critical pairs (φ∗,ψ∗) at which x¯ becomes unstable for the case
G = G with ψ′ = ψ. The dashed curve is that for the case G = G. The uniform distribution x¯ is stable
for the regions above these curves, where the gray regions correspond to G = G×. Observe that the solid
curve stays below the dashed curve. That is, x¯ is stable for a wider range of (φ,ψ) when the economy is
more connected.
To see this section considers general G with arbitrary ψ′ ∈ (0, 1) (with ψ′ > 2ψ− 1 to satisfy
Assumption 1 (b)). We have the following characterization, which includes Propositions 6 and 7
as the special cases.
Proposition 8. Suppose n = 4. Assume D in (5.1) and G = G with arbitrary ψ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that
ψ′ > 2ψ− 1. Then, either z∗ = z1 ≡ (1, 0,−1, 0) or z∗ = z2 ≡ (1,−1, 1,−1), andω∗ = max{ω1,ω2},
with ωk = Ω(χk,λk) where
χ1 ≡ χ, χ2 ≡ χ2, λ1 ≡ 1− ψ
′
1+ 2ψ+ ψ′
∈ (0, 1), and λ2 ≡ 1− 2ψ+ ψ
′
1+ 2ψ+ ψ′
∈ (0, 1). (5.14)
The uniform distribution x¯ is linearly stable if and only if ω∗ < 0. When x¯ become unstable, then either the
mono-centric pattern x¯+ ez1 if ω∗ = ω1 or the duo-centric pattern x¯+ ez2 emerges (e > 0) if ω∗ = ω2.
Simply put, the duo-centric pattern (Figure 6b) can emerge, in contrast to Sections Section 5.1 and
Section 5.2. The condition for the emergence of the duo-centric pattern is simply ω∗ = ω2 (or
ω2 > ω1) when x¯ becomes unstable; the formation of the duo-centric pattern is more profitable
for workers than the mono-centric pattern when ω∗ = ω2.
We highlight that ψ′ > ψ is necessary for the duo-centric pattern to emerge. When ψ′ > ψ,
then region 1 is more socially “connected” to region 3 than to regions 2 or 4, and hence benefits
more from social interactions with region 3 than with the others. Thus, with respect to G, the
regions at the antipodal locations in the circle are closer.
Similar to Sections 5.1 and 5.2, λ1 and λ2 are the eigenvalues of the row-normalized social
proximity matrix. They are the indices of the inter-regional interaction costs when, respectively,
the mono-centric and duo-centric configurations emerge. For instance, by employing the formula
for ω∗, we show that the uniform distribution can be stable for some φ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if
(σ− 1)max{λ1,λ2} < 1. If inter-regional communication is almost prohibitive (i.e., ψ → 0 and
ψ′ → 0), we have λ1 → 1 and λ2 → 1. Thus, x¯ cannot be stable for such a case if σ > 2, which
is obviously satisfied by the standard values of σ (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004). When σ is
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Figure 9: Bifurcation diagram for the four-region circular economy with social proximity matrix G×.
Notes: ψ′ = ψ1/2 > ψ with ψ1/2 = 0.65 and σ = 4. The solid curves indicate stable equilibria, whereas
the dashed or dotted curves indicate unstable ones. The red curves are mono-centric patterns, whereas
the blue curve duo-centric pattern. The schematics by the solid curves show representative snapshots of
associated stable spatial patterns.
sufficiently large, thenworkers are better off concentrating on a single region because differentiated
goods are substitutes whereas inter-regional social interactions are too costly.
Figure 9 shows a numerical example in which ω∗ = ω2, so that stable duo-centric patterns
emerge from x¯. In line with Figure 7, φ∗1 and φ∗2 indicate, respectively, the level of φ at which we
have ω1 = 0 and ω2 = 0. When φ is small, a mono-centric distribution is stable (solid red curve),
which is similar to Figure 7. As φ increases, dispersion proceeds. The difference from Figure 7 is
that region 3 attracts more workers than regions 2 and 4 in this process. For some range of φ, there
is a duo-centric concentration towards regions 1 and 3, but with asymmetry such that x1 > x3.
At some point, the economy jumps to the symmetric two-peaked distribution (solid blue curve).3
The two-peaked distribution connects smoothly to the uniform distribution at the critical value
φ∗2 . Proposition 8 predicts the bifurcation at φ∗2 .
5.4 Super-regions
This section considers the caseG = G to investigate the role of hierarchical structure in the social
proximity between regions as shown in Figure 5c. In the network G, the pairs of regions {1, 2}
and {3, 4} can be interpreted as “super-regions.” Social interactions between the regions in the
same super-region is freer than those between two regions in different super-regions, since we
assume ψ′ < ψ without loss of generality.
The following proposition shows that the stability of x¯ is determined by ψ′ and the bifurcation
from x¯ leads to the formation of a North–South pattern in Figure 6c.
Proposition 9. Suppose n = 4. AssumeD in (5.1) andG = G with ψ′ < ψ. Then, ω∗ = Ω(χ,λ′) and
3This jump is encountered at a limit point for the mono-centric configuration (indicated by ♦), which is evidence of
a saddle-node bifurcation.
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Figure 10: Bifurcation diagram for the four-region circular economy with social proximity matrix G.
Notes: ψ′ = ψ2 < ψwith ψ = 0.8 and σ = 4. The solid curves indicate stable equilibria, whereas the dashed
or dotted curves indicate unstable ones. The red curves are mono-centric patterns, whereas the blue curve
duo-centric pattern. The schematics by the solid curves show representative snapshots of associated stable
spatial patterns. For φ ∈ (φ∗3 , φ∗2 ), the North–South pattern emerges. The economy exhibits a hierarchical
structure of the North–South asymmetry and intra-regional asymmetry for the range φ ∈ (0, φ∗3 ).
z∗ = (1, 1,−1,−1), where λ′ ≡ 1−ψ′1+ψ′ . The uniform distribution x¯ is linearly stable if and only if ω∗ < 0.
When x¯ become unstable, then a North–South pattern of the form x¯+ ez∗ (e > 0) emerges.
That is, the four-region economy with G = G has quite similar properties as the two-region
case. The intra-super-region interaction level, ψ, does not affect the bifurcation from x¯ since ω∗
does not include it. Thus, we can regard each regional super-region as a “big” region, sowe recover
the two-region economy. There are two other possible migration patterns (i.e., the eigenvectors of
V), but they are less profitable thanNorth–South pattern z∗. To be concrete, the possiblemigration
patterns in this economy are
z1 = z∗ = (1, 1,−1,−1), z2 = (1,−1, 1,−1), and z3 = (1,−1,−1, 1). (5.15)
However, Appendix A.2 shows that the gains (i.e., the eigenvalues of V) associated with these
patterns satisfy ω∗ = ω1 = max{ω1,ω2,ω3} for all (φ,ψ, σ). The second migration pattern, z2,
is the duo-centric pattern (Figure 6b), whereas the third an East–West pattern (90◦ rotation of the
North–South pattern). The duo-centric pattern is less profitable than the East–West pattern, be-
cause, in the latter, the two big regions are close to each other and hence enjoy greater productivity
than the former pattern. Similarly, the North–South pattern benefits from greater productivity
than the East–West pattern, since the freeness of interaction between the two big regions are ψ in
the former and ψ′ < ψ in the latter. Thus, the most profitable deviation from x¯ is North–South
pattern z1.
Figure 10 shows a numerical example for this case. Each φ∗k indicates the level of φ at which
we have ωk = 0 (k = 1, 2, 3). When φ is small, again a one-peaked distribution is stable (solid
red curve). As φ increases, dispersion proceeds. The difference from Figure 7 or Figure 9 is that
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the North regions consistently attract more workers than the South. In the range φ ∈ (0, φ∗3), it
is the process of gradual dispersion between regional super-regions, and the dispersion within
the North. For the South, the process is ambiguous because there are two effects (within- and
between-bloc) at work. For the range φ ∈ (φ∗3 , φ∗1) there is a steady North–South pattern, which
connects smoothly to x¯ at the critical value φ∗1 as predicted by Proposition 9. The process is
understood as a hierarchical combination of the two-region story in Section 4.
We can show that the economy becomes closer to the baseline case in Section 5.1 as ψ′ → ψ.
We have φ∗3 → φ∗1 as ψ′ → ψ and then the bifurcation at φ∗1 lead to the mono-centric pattern
(Figure 6a) as in Section 5.1. In fact, when z1 and z3 become profitable at the same time, we see
the migration pattern becomes 12 (z1 + z3) = (1, 0,−1, 0), i.e., the mono-centric pattern.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper considered a bare-bones general equilibrium model with two proximity structures,
one due to trade linkage and the other due to social linkage. The former is the standard linkage
which many economic geography models in the literature focus on. In the symmetric two-region
economy, we confirm that uniform dispersion is stable when the economy is integrated in terms of
trade or social interactions. This is similar to the so-called “re-dispersion” in economic geography
modelswith urban costs. Inmany-region settings, there are twofirst-order theoretical insights into
the role of the additional proximity structure due to social interactions. First, it is demonstrated
that the structure of the social proximity matrix affects the timing of endogenous agglomeration.
Particularly, when the economy is socially more connected, there is less incentive for endogenous
agglomeration. Second, the structure of social interaction network can, even when it is ex-ante
symmetric, endogenously determine the overall form of the spatial distribution of workers across
regions. Our examples, for instance, show that the number of major economic centers can depend
on the interaction structure. When trade costs of goods become less relevant, the structure of
social proximity emerges as a determinant of geographical distribution of workers.
The model considered in this paper obviously is a simple reduced-form; we build on the
compromise that the social proximity structure is exogenously given. As discussed in Section 1,
there are various interpretations for the “social proximity” matrix. The most interesting extension
would be the endogenous determination of the social proximity structure in equilibrium. For such
micro-founded models, our framework can be utilized to obtain coarse insights into the role of an
additional network structure.
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A Proofs
This appendix collects the omitted proofs and derivations.
Notations. For vector-valued function f , we denote Fx ≡ [∂ fi/∂xj]. For vector x, we denote xˆ ≡ diag[x].
A.1 General properties
Proof of Lemma 1. We build on Alvarez and Lucas (2007). See also Allen (2019).
Existence. Let the excess demand function Ψ(w) = (Ψi(w))i∈N be defined as follows:
Ψi(w) ≡ 1wi
(
∑
k∈N
aσ−1i w
1−σ
i φik
∑l∈N aσ−1l w
1−σ
l φlk
wkxk − wixi
)
. (A.1)
Then, market wage is a solution for Ψ(w) = 0. We see (i) Ψ(·) is continuous, (ii) Ψ(·) is homogeneous
of degree zero, (iii) w>Ψ(w) = 0 for any w because of normalization of world income, and (iv) Ψi(w) >
−xi > −1. Also, (v) for any sequence {wn}∞n=0 of strictly positive wn = (wni )i∈N that converges to some
w˜ = (w˜i)i∈N such that w˜i∗ = 0 for some i∗ ∈ N , we have maxi∈N Ψi(wn)→ ∞ as n→ ∞, because we see
max
i∈N
Ψi(w) = max
i∈N ∑k∈N
aσ−1i w
−σ
i φik
∑l∈N aσ−1l w
1−σ
l φlk
wkxk −max
i∈N
xi (A.2)
> max
i∈N
max
j∈N
aσ−1i w
−σ
i φij
∑l∈N aσ−1l w
1−σ
l φl j
wjxj − 1 (A.3)
> max
i∈N
aσ−1i φij∗
∑l∈N aσ−1l φl j∗
wj∗xj∗
w−σi
(mink∈N wk)1−σ
− 1 (A.4)
> max
i∈N
aσ−1i φij∗
∑l∈N aσ−1l φl j∗
wj∗xj∗
1
mink∈N wk
− 1, (A.5)
where j∗ ∈ N is the regional index that achieves the second maximum in (A.3). The right hand side of
the last display (A.5) goes to positive infinity because mink∈N wnk → mink∈N w˜k = w˜i∗ = 0 as n → ∞ and
the other component is positive. Therefore, Ψ(w) satisfies hypothesis (i)–(v) of Mas-Colell et al. (1995),
Proposition 17.C.1 on p.585 and there is w such that Ψ(w) = 0 and wi > 0 for all i ∈ N .
Uniqueness. Note that Ψ(·) has the gross substitute property. That is,
∂Ψi(w)
∂wj
=
1
wi
(
mijxj + (σ− 1) ∑
k∈N
mikmjkwkxk
1
wj
)
> 0 (A.6)
for any i 6= j, where we let
mij =
aσ−1i w
1−σ
i φij
∑l∈N aσ−1l w
1−σ
l φl j
. (A.7)
Note that the first term in the parenthesis is nonnegative and the second term is positive. Hence, by
Proposition 17.F.3 of Mas-Colell et al. (1995), there exists unique w up to scale such that Ψ(w) = 0. Thus,
there is unique w that satisfy Ψ(w) = 0 and ∑i∈N wixi = 1.
Diverge when xi → 0. By rewriting the condition Ψi(x) = 0, we see
wσi =
1
xi
∑
k∈N
aσ−1i φik
∑l∈N aσ−1l w
1−σ
l φlk
wkxk >
1
xi
min
k∈N
aσ−1i φik
∑l∈N aσ−1l w
1−σ
l φlk
∑
j∈K
wjxj (A.8)
>
1
xi
min
k∈N
aσ−1i φik
∑l∈N aσ−1l φlk
min
l∈N
wσ−1l = C1C2x
−1
i , (A.9)
whereC1 ≡ mink∈N aσ−1i φik
(
∑l∈N aσ−1l φlk
)−1
> 0 andC2 ≡ minl∈N wσ−1l > 0, i.e.,wi → ∞ as xi → 0.
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Proof of Proposition 1. In general, a spatial equilibrium is a spatial distribution x ∈ X such that the following
Nash equilibrium condition is met for the location choice of workers:{
v∗ = vi(x) for all regions i ∈ N with xi > 0,
v∗ ≥ vi(x) for any region i ∈ N with xi = 0, (A.10)
where v∗ is an equilibrium payoff. The following variational inequality problem is equivalent to (A.10):
Find x ∈ X such that v(x)>(y− x) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ X . (VIP)
Every region is necessarily populated at any spatial equilibriumwhenD andG are positive (i.e., φij > 0
and ψij > 0 for all i, j ∈ N ). First, ai(x) > 0 for all i ∈ N at any x ∈ X when G is positive. Next, we see
vσ−1i = w
σ−1
i ∑
j∈N
aσ−1j w
1−σ
j φji > w
σ−1
i ∑
j 6=i
aσ−1j w
1−σ
j φji > C3C4w
σ−1
i (A.11)
where C3 ≡ minj 6=i aσ−1j φij > 0 (by positivity of φij) and C4 ≡ minj 6=i w1−σj > 0 (by positivity of wi shown
by Lemma 1). Note also that C4 is bounded for all positive x.
By (A.11) and (A.9), for any sequence of positive spatial patterns {xn}∞n=1 that converges to a spatial
distribution such that xi = 0, wi(xn) and vi(xn) both diverge to positive infinity as n → ∞. On the other
hand, by Lemma 1, w is uniquely given if we focus on the regions with positive population N+ ≡ {k ∈
N | xk > 0} by letting wi := ∞ and wixi := 0 for all i ∈ N0 ≡ {k ∈ N | xk = 0}. Then, vi(x) is finite for
all i ∈ N+, while vi(x) is infinitely large for any i ∈ N0. Since such spatial distribution cannot be a spatial
equilibrium, every region is necessarily populated in equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium condition (A.10)
in fact reduces to the equality: vi(x) = vj(x) for all i, j ∈ N .
Consider the following variational inequality problem, which is a “restricted” version of (VIP):
Find x ∈ Xe such that v(x)>(y− x) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ Xe, (VIPe)
where Xe ≡ {x ∈ X | xi > e ∀i ∈ N} for some e > 0. Since v is differentiable and thus continuous on Xe,
andXe is compact and convex, by Corollary 2.2.5 of Facchinei and Pang (2003), the set of solutions for (VIPe)
is nonempty and compact for any choice of e > 0. There is some e > 0 for which all solutions for (VIPe)
are in the (relative) interior of Xe because vi(x) is continuous in x and diverges when xi → 0. Because any
interior solution for (VIPe) must satisfy vi(x) = vj(x) for all i, j ∈ N , they are spatial equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose φij = 1 and ψij = 1 for all i, j ∈ N . Then, ai(x) = 1 and
mij =
w1−σi φij
∑l∈N w1−σl φl j
= mi ≡
w1−σi
∑l∈N w1−σl
∈ (0, 1), . (A.12)
This implies that
wixi = ∑
j∈N
mijwjxj = mi ∑
j∈N
wjxj = mi. (A.13)
Also, we see
vi(x) =
wi
Pi
=
(
w1−σi
∑j∈N w1−σj
) 1
1−σ
= m
1
1−σ
i . (A.14)
Since all regions are populated in equilibrium, we have mi = m¯ ∈ (0, 1) for all i ∈ N for x to be an
equilibrium. By (A.12), wi = w¯ > 0 for all i ∈ N . From (A.13), we conclude xi = m¯w¯ = x¯ = 1n for all i ∈ N .
That is, x¯ is the unique equilibrium. The stability of x¯ can be shown by knowing Vx is negative definite at
x = x¯. In fact, Vx is symmetric at x¯ and all of its relevant eigenvalues take the same value −σ−1 < 0. This
can be shown by letting χk → 0 and λk → 0 in Fact A.1 shown below.
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Proof of Proposition 3. When φij = 0 and ψij = 0 so that inter-regional trade and social interactions are
prohibitive, we have ai = xi for all i ∈ N . Further, the market equilibrium conditions reduce to:
wixi = xσ−1i w
1−σ
i wixi, (A.15)
thereby wi = xi. Thus, Pi = (xσ−1i x
1−σ
i )
1/(1−σ) = 1 and vi(x) = xi. Therefore, any spatial distribution in
which the populated regions have the same population is an equilibrium when φij and ψij vanish for all
i 6= j. However, all such equilibria with more than one populated regions cannot be stable under natural
dynamics since any migration between populated regions induce relative payoff advantages. Therefore,
the economy ends up with a complete mono-centric agglomeration when φij = 0 and ψij = 0 for all i 6= j.
Because equilibria is continuous in φij and ψij, we conclude the assertion.
A.2 Stability of the uniform distribution
We first give general characterization of stability of x¯ for both n = 2 and n = 4. Our approach build on
Akamatsu et al. (2012), which is recently synthesized by Akamatsu et al. (2019).
For any D > 0 and G > 0, we compute that
Vx = vˆ(x)
(
M> aˆ−1Ax +
(
I−M>
)
wˆ−1Wx
)
(A.16)
whereM = [mij]withmij defined by (A.7). The Jacobian matrix of wage with respect to spatial distribution
x,Wx, is given by the implicit function theorem regarding the short-run market equilibrium condition:
zi(x,w) ≡ wixi − ∑
k∈N
mikwkxk = 0 (A.17)
asWx = −Z−1w Zx. We compute
Zw =
(
σyˆ− (σ− 1)MyˆM> −Myˆ
)
wˆ−1, (A.18)
Zx =
(
yˆ− (σ− 1)
(
yˆ−MyˆM>
)
aˆ−1Ax xˆ−Myˆ
)
xˆ−1 (A.19)
where y = (wixi)i∈N . We note Ax = G.
Consider a n-region economy (n ≥ 2). Suppose uniform distribution x¯ = (x¯, x¯, . . . , x¯) with x¯ = 1n . Let
D¯ and G¯ be the row-normalized versions of D and G. We haveM = D¯ and aˆ−1Ax = G¯ at x¯. We impose
the following assumption on D¯ and G¯, which is satisfied by our examples in Sections 4 and 5.
Assumption A.3. Both D¯ and G¯ are either circulants or block circulants with circulant blocks (BCCBs).
Under the assumption, D¯ and G¯ commute. In turn, we evaluate as follows:
Wx = − w¯x¯ (σI+ (σ− 1)D¯)
−1
(−I+ (σ− 1) (I+ D¯) G¯) (A.20)
Vx =
v¯
x¯
(σI+ (σ− 1)D¯)−1 (−(I− D¯) + ((σ− 1)I+ σD¯)G¯) , (A.21)
where v¯ is the uniform level of payoff at x¯. We let V = x¯v¯Vx. By assumption, V is real and symmetric.
When V is negative definite with respect to TX = {z ∈ Rn | ∑i∈N zi = 0}, x¯ is evolutionary stable
state (see Sandholm, 2010, Observation 8.3.11). Then, x¯ is stable under all admissible dynamics. Since V is
symmetric, it is negative definite if and only if all of its eigenvalues with respect to TX is negative.
We have the following fact (see, e.g., Horn and Johnson, 2012).
Fact A.1. Under Assumption A.3, the eigenvalues of V are given by:
ωk = Ω(χk,λk) ≡ Ω
](χk,λk)
Ω[(χk)
∀k, (A.22)
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where χk and λk are, respectively, the kth eigenvalues of D¯ and G¯, and we define
Ω](χ,λ) ≡ −(1− χ) + ((σ− 1) + σχ) λ, (A.23)
Ω[(χ) ≡ σ+ (σ− 1)χ. (A.24)
The three matrices V, D¯, and G¯ share the same set of eigenvectors. One eigenvector is 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) and is
orthogonal to TX . The other eigenvectors {zk} span TX and each satisfies z>k 1 = 0. ♦
The formula (A.24) is simply the translation of the matrix relationship (A.21) into an eigenvalue rela-
tionship, which made possible by the properties of circulant matrices (or BCCBs). In effect, the stability of
x¯ is determined by eigenvalues {ωk} that corresponds to the eigenvectors other than 1.
It is a standard fact in dynamical systems theory that when some eigenvaluesωk switches from negative
to positive, then the state is pushed towards the direction of the associated eigenvector (see, e.g., Kuznetsov,
2004, Chapter 5). (The “critical” eigenvector is tangent to the unstable manifold emanating from x¯.) When
ωmax ≡ max
k
{ωk} (A.25)
turns its sign from negative to positive, then the spatial distribution is perturbed towards the direction of
the associated eigenvector zk∗ , where k∗ ≡ arg maxk{ωk}. Intuitively, each eigenvalues ωk is the gain for
migrants when they collaterally migrate toward the direction of the associated eigenvector.
To be more explicit, we proceed as follows. Consider a general perturbation of x¯ such that x = x¯+ z,
where z>1 = 0. Rewrite z as
z = ∑
k∈K
ckzk, (A.26)
where K ≡ {1, 2, 3} and {zk}k∈K are the eigenvectors of V such that z>k 1 = 0 and ‖zk‖2 = z>k zk = 1. For
our examples of D and G, matrix V is symmetric. Thus, the eigendecompositionn of V is given by:
V = ω011> + ∑
k∈K
ωkzkz
>
k , (A.27)
where ωk is the eigenvalue associated with zk, with z0 = 1 = (1, 1, 1, 1). By plugging (A.26) and (A.27) into
(5.4), we can evaluate ω¯ as:
ω¯ = z>Vz = ∑
k∈K
ωkc2k . (A.28)
It shows that ω¯ is maximized by z = zk∗ , where k∗ = arg maxk∈K ωk:
ωmax ≡ max
z:‖z‖=1
ω¯ = ωk∗ , (A.29)
where we assume ‖z‖2 = z>z = ∑k∈K c2k = 1. The uniform distribution is stable when
ωmax = ωk∗ = max
k∈K
{ωk} < 0. (A.30)
The relevant eigenvalues {ωk} are given by the formula (A.22). They depend on the properties of D¯
and G¯ through {χk} and {λk}. From (A.22), the stability of x¯ switches when:
max
k
{
Ω](χk,λk)
}
(A.31)
changes its sign from negative to positive, since we have Ω[(χk) > 0 for all examples considered in this
paper. In the following, we provide the proofs for each examples in Sections 4 and 5.
Proof of Proposition 4. When n = 2, both D¯ and G¯ are circulants. V can be diagonalized by the following
discrete Fourier transformation (DFT) matrix:
Z2 ≡ 1√
2
[
1 1
1 −1
]
, (A.32)
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where each columnvector is an eigenvector (migrationpattern) ofV. The relevant eigenvector is z = (1,−1),
because 1 = (1, 1) violates the conservation of workers’ population. The eigenvalue of D¯ and G¯ associated
with z are, respectively, given by
χ =
1− φ
1+ φ
and λ = 1− ψ
1+ ψ
. (A.33)
That ω = Ω(χ,λ) < 0 implies V is negative definite with respect to TX and in turn the stability of x¯.
Proof of Propositions 6, 7, and 8. Both D¯ and G¯ are circulant matrices. The social proximity matrices con-
sidered in these propositions are special cases of general specification G. For these exampels, V is
diagonalized by the following DFT matrix:
Z4 ≡ 12

1 1 1 1
1 i −1 −i
1 −1 1 −1
1 −i −1 i
 (A.34)
where i is the imaginary unit (i2 = −1). The relevant (real) eigenvectors are obtained by combining the
columns of Z4 as follows: z1 = (1, 0,−1, 0), z2 = (1,−1, 1,−1), and z3 = (0, 1, 0,−1), where we ommit
the normalizing constants for simplicity. z1 and z3 share the same eigenvalues. This is because z1 and z3
represent the same spatial configuration (the economy is symmetric under rotation).
The eigenvalues of D¯ associated with z1 and z2 are, respectively,
χ1 =
1− φ
1+ φ
and χ2 =
(
1− φ
1+ φ
)2
. (A.35)
Also, the eigenvalues of G¯ associated with z1 and z2 are, respectively,
λ1 =
1− ψ′
1+ 2ψ+ ψ′ and λ2 =
1− 2ψ+ ψ′
1+ 2ψ+ ψ′ . (A.36)
The uniform distribution is stable when ωk = Ω(χk,λk) < 0 for both k = 1 and k = 2. ψ′ = ψ2
implies Proposition 6, whereas ψ′ = ψ implies Proposition 7. For both the two cases, we have ω1 =
max{ω1,ω2}, thereby mono-centric pattern z1 (Figure 6a) emerges from x¯. Proposition 8 follows because
k = arg maxk{ω1,ω2} depends on the values of (φ,ψ,ψ′). Particularly, ψ′ > ψ is necessary forω2 > ω1.
Proof of Proposition 9. Both D and G are 2× 2 BCCBs. Then, V is diagonalized by the following two-
dimensional DFT matrix:
Z2 ⊗ Z2 = 1√
2
[
Z2 Z2
Z2 −Z2
]
=
1
2

1 1 1 1
1 −1 1 −1
1 1 −1 −1
1 −1 −1 1
 (A.37)
The relevant eigenvectors are z1 = (1, 1,−1,−1), z2 = (1,−1, 1,−1), and z3 = (1,−1,−1, 1). z1 is the
North–South pattern in Figure 6c, whereas z3 is its rotation (the “East–West” pattern). z2 is the duo-centric
pattern.
The eigenvalues of D¯ associated with z1, z2, and z3 are, respectively,
χ1 =
1− φ
1+ φ
, χ2 =
(
1− φ
1+ φ
)2
, and χ3 =
1− φ
1+ φ
. (A.38)
Similarly, the eigenvalues of G¯ associated with z1, z2, and z3 are, respectively,
λ1 =
1− ψ′
1+ ψ′ , λ2 =
(
1− ψ′
1+ ψ′
)(
1− ψ
1+ ψ
)
, and λ3 =
1− ψ
1+ ψ
. (A.39)
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We have ωk = Ω(χk,λk) = 0 if and only if ω
]
k ≡ Ω](χk,λk) = 0. Since λ1 > λ3 > λ2 and χ1 = χ3 > χ2, we
see ω]1 = maxk{ω]k}. Thus, North–South pattern z1 (Figure 6c) must emerge when x¯ become unstable.
A.3 Pitchfork bifurcation from the uniform distribution
Proof of Proposition 5. When n = 2, the uniform distribution x¯ = (x¯, x¯) can be viewed as steady-state
solution y = 0 for the following one-dimensional autonomous system:
y˙ = ∆v(y, µ) ≡ v1(x(y))− v2(x(y)), (A.40)
wherewe choose y ∈ Y ≡ (−x¯, x¯) and let x(y) = (x1(y), x2(y)) ≡ (x¯+ y, x¯− y). The bifurcation parameter
µ indicates either φ or ψ. Under admissible dynamics, the bifurcation diagram become smoothly equivalent
to the system (A.40). In the following, prime (’) denotes differentiation with respect to one-dimensional
variable y.
In general, the system (A.40) undergoes pitchfork bifurcation at (y, µ) = (0, µ∗) when ∆v(y, µ) is odd
in y and the following conditions are met (see, e.g., Wiggins, 2003, Section 20.1E):
∆v′(0, µ∗) = 0, ∆v′′(0, µ∗) = 0, ∆v′′′(0, µ∗) 6= 0, ∂∆v(0, µ
∗)
∂µ
= 0, and ∂∆v
′(0, µ∗)
∂µ
6= 0. (A.41)
We see ∆v is odd: ∆v(−y, µ) = −∆v(y, µ). The fourth condition also follows, for ∆v(0, µ) = 0 for all µ.
The first condition (nonhyperbolicity) ensures that µ = µ∗ is the bifurcation point:
∆v′(0, µ∗) =
(
∂v1(x¯)
∂x1
∂x1(0)
∂y
+
∂v1(x¯)
∂x2
∂x2(0)
∂y
)
−
(
∂v2(x¯)
∂x1
∂x1(0)
∂y
+
∂v2(x¯)
∂x2
∂x2(0)
∂y
)
(A.42)
=
(
∂v1(x¯)
∂x1
− ∂v1(x¯)
∂x2
)
−
(
∂v2(x¯)
∂x1
− ∂v2(x¯)
∂x2
)
= z>Vxz =
2v¯
x¯
ω(µ∗) (A.43)
where z = (1,−1) and we recall ω is the eigenvalue of V = x¯v¯Vx associated with z. The bifurcation point
regarding freeness parameters (φ,ψ) is the solution for ω = 0 and we have ∆v′(0, µ) = 0. For ω(φ,ψ) = 0
(or Ω](χ(φ),λ(ψ)) = 0) to admit solution such that (χ,λ) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1), we need
λ∗ ≡ 1− χ
(σ− 1) + σχ ∈ (0, 1) ∀χ ∈ (0, 1), (A.44)
or, equivalently, either σ > 2, or σ ∈ (1, 2] and χ ∈ ( 2−σσ+1 , 1). We assume either of these below.
From (A.43), we see
∂∆v′(0, µ∗)
∂µ
=
2
x¯
(
∂v¯
∂µ
ω(µ∗) + v¯∂ω(µ
∗)
∂µ
)
=
2v¯
x¯
∂ω
∂µ
(A.45)
by noting that ω(µ∗) = 0. With (A.22), we show the fifth condition in (A.41):
∂∆v′(0, µ∗)
∂φ
=
2v¯
x¯
∂ω
∂χ
∂χ
∂φ
= − 2
x¯
· (1+ λ)(2σ− 1)
(σ+ (σ− 1)χ)2 ·
2
(1+ φ)2
< 0, (A.46)
∂∆v′(0, µ∗)
∂ψ
=
2v¯
x¯
∂ω
∂λ
∂λ
∂ψ
= − 2
x¯
· (σ− 1) + σχ
σ+ (σ− 1)χ ·
2
(1+ ψ)2
< 0. (A.47)
For ∆v′′(0, µ∗) and ∆v′′′(0, µ∗), we resort to more explicit computations. Let w1 : Y → R+ and
w2 : Y → R+ denote, respectively, the nominal wages of regions 1 and 2 as functions of y ∈ Y . We first
derive required derivatives of w1 and w2. By the normalization of income, we have
w1(y)x1(y) + w2(y)x2(y) = w1(y)(x¯+ y) + w2(y)(x¯− y) = 1 ∀y ∈ Y (A.48)
and w1(0) = w2(0) = w¯ ≡ 1. These imply
w′1(0) = −w′2(0), w′′1 (0) = w′′2 (0) = −
2
x¯
w′1(0), and w′′′1 (0) = −w′′′2 (0). (A.49)
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For instance, we have w′1(y)(x¯ + y) + w1(y) + w′2(y)(x¯ − y) − w′2(y) = 0. With w1(0) = w2(0) = 1, it
implies that w′1(0) = −w′2(0), which is a manifestation that the regions are symmetric when y = 0.
In fact, w′1(0) is the eigenvalue ofWx(x¯) associated with z = (1,−1), because we have
w′1(0) =
∂w1(x¯)
∂x1
∂x1(0)
∂y
+
∂w1(x¯)
∂x2
∂x2(0)
∂y
=
∂w1(x¯)
∂x1
− ∂w1(x¯)
∂x2
(A.50)
w′2(0) =
∂w2(x¯)
∂x1
∂x1(0)
∂y
+
∂w2(x¯)
∂x2
∂x2(0)
∂y
=
∂w2(x¯)
∂x1
− ∂w2(x¯)
∂x2
= −w′1(0), (A.51)
which is, w′1(0)z =Wx(x¯)z. Therefore, we have
w′1(0) = −
w¯
x¯
· 1− (σ− 1)(1+ χ)λ
Ω[(χ)
, (A.52)
where we recall Ω[(χ) ≡ σ + (σ − 1)χ. Then, w′′(0) can be evaluated by the second identity in (A.49).
Also, by a patient algebra, we compute w′′′1 (0) as follows:
w′′′1 (0) =
2
x¯3
(
−3λ2 + 3λ(1+ λ)(3+ λ)
Ω[(χ)
+
(
−3(σ+ 1)
Ω[(χ)2
+
2σ(σ+ 1)
Ω[(χ)3
− σ(2σ− 1)
Ω[(χ)4
)
(1+ λ)3
)
. (A.53)
Further, a(y) = (a1(y), a2(y)) ≡ (a1(x(y)), a2(x(y))) satisfy
x¯
a1(0)
a′1(0) = −
x¯
a2(0)
a′2(0) =
x¯
a¯
(1− ψ) = 1− ψ
1+ ψ
= λ (A.54)
and a′′i (0) = a
′′′
i (0) = · · · = 0. We nonte that a1(0) = a2(0) = a¯ ≡ x¯(1+ ψ).
By direct computations employing the above results, we confirm that
∆v′′(0, µ∗) = v¯(1− χ)
(
−w′1(0)2 + w′2(0)2 + w′′1 (0)− w′′2 (0)
)
= 0 (A.55)
from (A.49). Therefore, the second condition in (A.41) is met.
After some tedious calculations and manipulations, we get:
∆v′′′(0, µ∗) = −4v¯
x¯3
· (1+ λ)
3
Ω[(χ)4
·Θ, (A.56)
where we define
Θ ≡ σ(2σ− 1) +Ω[(χ)
(
3+ σ
(
(σ+ 1)χ2 + (4σ− 5)χ+ σ− 5
))
. (A.57)
We can show Θ > 0 provided that bifurcation occur (i.e., condition (A.44) is satisfied). Since the other
components of ∆v′′′(0, µ∗) are obviously negative, we have ∆v′′′(0, µ∗) < 0 at critical values of φ or ψ.
Thus, all the five conditions in (A.41) are met at x¯. The economy undergoes pitchfork bifurcations along
smooth paths where either the freeness of social interactions or the freeness of trade increases, at the break
points defined by ψ∗ and φ∗, respectively. Moreover, ∆v′′′(0, µ∗) < 0 implies that the pitchfork bifurcations
are supercritical, i.e., the bifurcated branches are stable.
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Figure 11: Stability of x¯ in the two-region economy.
Notes: The uniform distribution x¯ is stable for the shaded (gray) region of (φ,ψ) and the black solid curve
indicates the critical pair of (φ,ψ) where x¯ becomes unstable. The horizontal and vertical dashed lines
in Figure 11c correspond to the parametric paths for the bifurcation diagrams Figure 2a and Figure 2b,
respectively. The schematic on each (gray or white) parametric region indicates the representative spatial
pattern in the parametric region.
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Figure 12: Stability of x¯ in the four-region economies with G and G× = G|ψ′=ψ.
Notes: The black solid curves show the critical pairs (φ∗,ψ∗) at which x¯ becomes unstable for the case
G = G with ψ′ = ψ. The dashed curves are those for the case G = G. The uniform distribution x¯ is
stable for the regions above these curves, where the gray regions correspond toG = G×. Observe that the
solid curves always stay below the dashed curves. That is, x¯ is stable for a wider range of (φ,ψ) when the
economy is more connected.
B Variations in the elasticity of substitution
Figures 11 and 12 report, respectively, variations of Figures 1 and 8 for three values of σ which are chosen
to exhaust all representative forms of the partition of the (φ,ψ)-space. For an empirically relevant range of
σ (between 3 and 10), the qualitative shape of the partitions stay invariant.
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